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A Splutter of Musketry?  The British military response 
to the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, 1951. 
 
This paper examines the British response to the crisis that resulted 
from the Iranian decision to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company in 1951.The British government contemplated the use of 
military force from the outset of the crisis and a series of plans were 
developed. Unfortunately, in a manner similar to the Suez Crisis five 
years later, the military were unable to provide a suitable response 
until political considerations had made the use of force unattractive. 
Despite this, the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of Defence, and the 
Chiefs of Staff continued to press for an armed response. This paper 
uses newly released archival sources to examine the military plans and 
preparations and to analyse the way in which these interacted with 
political considerations to undermine the British position in Iran. 
 
On 30 April 1951 the Iranian Majlis (parliament) passed a law nationalising the oil 
refinery on Abadan, an island on the Iranian side of the Shatt al Arab, the waterway 
that divides Iran and Iraq and flows into the Persian Gulf. The refinery and its 
facilities were the property of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), a company in 
which the British Government was the majority shareholder. At this time the oil 
refinery at Abadan was the largest in the world and the Iranian oil field was the most 
productive in the Middle East. Abadan and the oil fields of southern Iran provided a 
major source of supply for Britain and AIOC profits and tax revenue provided the 
British Government with a valuable source of income and scarce foreign currency. 
The refinery at Abadan was seen as a national asset of strategic importance and its 
nationalisation by the Iranians caused outrage and consternation in Britain. In the 
crisis that followed the Attlee administration investigated the possible use of military 
force but in the end decided against this course of action, instead referring the case 
first to the International Court of Justice and later to the United Nations (UN), without 
success. As a result British AIOC employees withdrew from Abadan and the Iranian 
government took control of the refinery. The consequent loss of British prestige has 
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been linked to later difficulties throughout the Middle East and ultimately to another 
nationalisation crisis, that of the Suez Canal in 1956.1   
 
In 1951 Britain possessed an army over 400,000 strong, had the second largest navy 
in the world and an air force more than capable of securing air superiority against the 
weak Iranian armed forces. Both the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Defence 
were in favour of military intervention to secure Abadan. The leader of the 
Conservative Party, Winston Churchill, believed that all that was required to settle the 
matter was ‘a splutter of musketry’.2 Against this background the non-use of military 
force during the Abadan crisis in 1951 is as interesting and instructive as was its use 
five years later against Egypt. The Abadan crisis was a key event in post-war British 
foreign policy.  It is surprising therefore that, in comparison with the 1956 Suez crisis, 
it has received relatively little scholarly attention. 3 The crisis revealed much about the 
state of the British armed forces in 1951 and the way in which military forces could 
both support and undermine political options. This paper will use newly released 
archive material to analyse the crisis from this angle, examining the various plans for 
military intervention and exploring the way in which military limitations influenced 
the political process. 
Genesis of the Crisis 
 
A detailed examination of the background to this crisis and of the political and 
diplomatic manoeuvrings that occurred is beyond the scope of this study. These issues 
have been addressed elsewhere.4 However, a basic introduction is required in order to 
understand the context in which military planning took place. British interest in 
Iranian oil dated back to 1901 when the first concession to drill for oil in Iran was 
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granted. In 1908 major reserves were discovered in the south and by 1913 these were 
being carried by pipeline to a refinery on the island of Abadan.5 In 1933 the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company, negotiated a sixty-year concession to extract oil and built-up 
the facilities at Abadan into the largest refinery in the world. By 1951 the AIOC had 
70,000 Iranian and 4500 British employees. Working conditions for the former, while 
better than those of most Iranians, were in no way comparable to the far superior 
conditions enjoyed by their European counterparts. This was the cause of resentment 
in Iran and of moral discomfort amongst some Labour politicians.   
 
In 1950 the AIOC made profits of £170 million, of which the British Government 
took thirty per cent in tax .6 Under the 1933 concession the Iranian Government 
received royalties of between 15 and 20 percent. In 1950 the Iranian oil fields yielded 
32.1 million tons of crude oil compared to 26.2 million tons in the US dominated 
Saudi Arabian fields. However, Saudi Arabia received an estimated $112 million in 
direct payment from oil companies compared to only $44.9 million for the Iranian 
government.7 Inevitably this inequitable situation caused resentment in Iran and 
brought pressure to renegotiate the 1933 agreement. The result was a Supplemental 
Oil Agreement in 1949, agreed between the Iranian government and the AIOC. Under 
this Supplemental Agreement royalties were to increase to a maximum of 30 percent. 
Unfortunately for the AIOC, before this agreement was ratified by the Majlis the 
Arabian-American Oil Company operating in Saudi Arabia concluded a deal based on 
a equal 50:50 split of profits between the company and the Saudi government. By 
early November 1950 the Iranians were aware of this deal and refused to contemplate 
anything other than an equivalent agreement. At the same time, a growing and very 
vocal body of opinion demanded nationalisation of what was seen as a key national 
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asset. Neither the AIOC nor the UK government was willing to give way on either 
issue until it was too late.8  
 
Strikes and riots were not uncommon at Abadan. In 1946 the British had deployed an 
Indian brigade and a Royal Navy cruiser to nearby Basra in Iraq when a general strike 
halted oil production and threatened the safety of AIOC staff.9 In the tense political 
atmosphere that existed in Iran at this time disturbances were inevitable. Political 
violence occurred across the country and in February 1951 the Prime Minister Ali 
Razmara was assassinated by religious extremists. Abadan was hit by a series of 
strikes amid agitation by nationalists and the communist Tudeh Party. Serious rioting 
on 12 April resulted in the death of three British subjects with six more injured. The 
following day the British Chiefs of Staff, the professional heads of the army, air force 
and navy, decided to send the Royal Navy cruiser HMS Gambia to the Gulf as a 
precautionary measure. Fortunately, Iranian troops were able to restore order in 
Abadan but the potential requirement for military intervention in order to protect 
British lives was to figure prominently in future British planning.   
 
The dominant Iranian figure in this crisis was Dr Mohammed Mussaddiq10. 
Mussaddiq was the ageing but charismatic leader of the nationalist National Front. 
Characterised by many British observers (including both the Ambassador in Tehran 
and the Foreign Secretary in London) as a madman or a lunatic he proved to be 
neither. Mussaddiq became Prime Minister on 19 April 1951 on the basis of his 
nationalistic appeal and powerful performances in the Majlis. Within 12 days a 
Nationalisation Law had been passed by the Majlis and signed by the Shah and on 2 
May the act of nationalisation passed into Iranian law.11 The Nationalisation Law 
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cancelled the 1933 concession and nationalised AIOC oil assets. The British 
government referred the case to the International Court of Justice at the Hague on the 
basis that the Iranians had broken a treaty entered into freely and had refused to 
discuss or negotiate the dispute under the arbitration articles provided for in the 1933 
agreement. In his memoirs Attlee claimed that it was not the act of nationalisation that 
he objected to but the fact that it had occurred without negotiation or appropriate 
compensation.  Attlee also claimed that ‘any attempt to coerce the Persian12 
Government by the use of force was out of the question’.13 This was disingenuous.  In 
reality the British considered the use of military force from the outset of the crisis and 
a series of plans were devised. 
The British Armed Forces 
In April 1951 the British Army was large by national standards. It had 202,000 
regular troops supported by 223,500 National Servicemen and 7,500 women.14 
Despite this, few troops could be made available for operations against Iran. With 
major commitments in Germany and Korea and involvement in the Malayan 
emergency and other imperial responsibilities the army was badly overstretched. The 
loss to Britain of the Indian Army with the independence of India and Pakistan in 
1947 removed one of the key elements of British power beyond Europe. The resulting 
problem of overstretch caused the period of National Service (conscription) to be 
increased from 12 months to 18 months in 1949 and then to two years in 1950.15 
Unfortunately, the requirement to train National Service personnel tied down a 
significant proportion of the regular army.  In 1950 the Imperial strategic reserve had 
consisted of the 29th Infantry Brigade Group and the 16th Independent Parachute 
Brigade. After the outbreak of war in Korea the 29th Infantry Brigade was sent to the 
Far East and was thus unavailable for operations against Iran.   
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 The 16th Independent Parachute Brigade was formed in 1948 after it had been decided 
to disband the 6th Airborne Division.16 In 1947 an airborne division was formed by 
the reservist Territorial Army but the 16th Independent Parachute Brigade was the 
only airborne force in the regular army and available at short notice.17 The Chiefs of 
Staff decided to deploy the brigade to Cyprus in May 1951.18 Initially the brigade was 
deployed to the Middle East in order to be ready to replace troops sent to Iran from 
Egypt. The Chiefs of Staff informed their subordinates in the Middle East that most of 
the brigade’s troops were unfit for airborne operations, having received insufficient 
training. At most one or two companies could be employed, perhaps to seize Abadan 
airfield.19 Indeed, the transport aircraft accumulated by RAF Transport Command in 
readiness for any operation concentrated in the Suez Canal Zone and not with the 
airborne troops at Cyprus. Later military plans included the Parachute Brigade 
amongst the forces to be deployed to Abadan, however, this was in an infantry rather 
than a parachute role.  
 
On paper the Royal Navy was an extremely powerful force. In 1951-52 it possessed 
five battleships, 14 aircraft carriers, 26 cruisers, 111 destroyers and 162 frigates.20 It 
was superior in size and strength to any other navy except that of the United States. 
Unfortunately, many of these ships were held in reserve or conducting trials and 
training, including all of the battleships and all but four of the aircraft carriers.  Like 
the army, the Royal Navy had a range of commitments around the globe that it was 
struggling to meet. In particular, the deployment of a large maritime force to the west 
coast of Korea reduced the availability of both ships and trained manpower elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, the ability of the navy to control the sea in the Persian Gulf was not 
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seriously open to question given the meagre assets available to Iran. The ability to 
exploit that control and to project power from the sea was more problematic. 
 
Royal Navy cruisers and destroyers could bombard targets in Abadan, but the 
circumstances in which they might be called to do so appeared limited. Bombarding 
the oil refinery or its environs could do little in itself to achieve government aims. The 
most likely job for naval forces was to land troops either on Abadan island itself or on 
the south-west coast of Iran. Amphibious capabilities had been neglected since 1945. 
At the end of the war Britain had possessed an enormous amphibious fleet and had a 
knowledge and experience of amphibious operations rivalled only by the United 
States.  Unfortunately a lack of priority saw the capability atrophy. By 1951 the only 
amphibious force that Britain possessed was the Amphibious Warfare Squadron based 
at Malta in the Mediterranean. This Squadron was designed to be able to lift an 
infantry battalion group and was capable of expanding to lift a full brigade group at 
30 days notice.21  In reality it was frequently under-manned and below its supposed 
complement of active ships and craft. The ships that it did possess were old and 
obsolescent and ill-suited to the requirements of rapid military intervention. The only 
military unit that trained for amphibious operations, No. 3 Commando Brigade, Royal 
Marines, was fully occupied ashore in Malaya helping to fight communist insurgents. 
In any case, this unit had not received serious training in amphibious operations for 
some time. A small battalion sized unit, 41 (Independent) Commando, Royal Marines, 
had been raised in order to conduct raiding operations in Korea and had conducted 
numerous landings. However, employment in Korea meant that it was also 
unavailable for operations against Iran.22
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The Royal Air Force (RAF) contribution to military operations in Iran was likely to 
fall into two basic categories. Firstly, and most importantly, it would be responsible 
for transporting troops by air into the theatre of operations. Secondly, it might also be 
required to provide fighter cover and close air support to troops on the ground. The 
government do not appear to have contemplated bombing ‘strategic’ targets in 
mainland Iran and there is no mention of such activity in the various plans discussed 
by the Chiefs of Staff.  Equally, the Chiefs do not appear to have been too concerned 
by the problem of gaining air superiority over southern Iran. The Imperial Iranian Air 
Force was small and was equipped with obsolete aircraft of World War II vintage.23 
The RAF had airfields at Bahrain and Sharjah both of which were British 
administered territories in the Persian Gulf and also at Habbaniya and Shaiba in Iraq. 
The latter were reinforced during the crisis.24
Military Planning 
 
Even before the Nationalisation Law was passed the British Foreign Secretary, 
Herbert Morrison, had asked the Chiefs of Staff to examine the practical possibilities 
of taking military action in Abadan. In a letter dated 20 March he noted two potential 
constraints that would return to haunt British military planners in the months ahead. 
Firstly, he was concerned that nationalist pressure within Iraq might limit the potential 
of staging military forces there and that they might have to be held in readiness 
elsewhere in the Gulf, further away from Abadan. Secondly, Morrison was also 
concerned that military action might provide the Soviet Union with an excuse to 
intervene in Iran under the terms of the Russo-Persian Treaty of 1921.25 The 
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prolonged Soviet occupation of northern Azerbaijan at the end of the Second World 
War remained in people’s minds.26
 
In response to Morrison’s request the Chiefs identified three alternative forms of 
military action: 
 
1. A show of force without actually entering Iranian territory. 
2. The provision of forces to protect British lives and property in the refinery  
area at Abadan and to evacuate British nationals. 
3. The defence of both Abadan and the South West Iranian oilfields against 
action by the Iranian Government or mob violence. 
 
A ‘show of force’ could be carried out by despatching a suitable naval force to the 
northern Gulf. Such an action could be done at relatively short notice. However, the 
Chiefs considered that the impact would be greater if an infantry battalion was moved 
to the vicinity of Abadan. Unfortunately the nearest British administered territories at 
Kuwait and Bahrain were some distance from the area in question and lacked the 
necessary facilities. Deployment to the RAF base at Shaiba (Iraq) would require the 
agreement of the Iraqi authorities.  This might not be forthcoming.27
 
A plan already existed to cater for the protection of lives and property at Abadan. 
Code-named Accleton, this plan was based around the air-lift of an infantry brigade, 
minus one battalion, to Shaiba from whence they could rapidly move to Abadan 
should the situation demand it.28 The plan was designed to meet a local internal 
security problem and was based upon the assumption that Iranian forces would not 
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oppose British intervention. It also assumed the availability of facilities in Iraq and 
could not be implemented satisfactorily without use of Shaiba.29 At their meeting on 
27 March the Chiefs of Staff concluded that if these assumptions proved to be invalid 
then alternatives to Accleton would be required.     
 
The Chiefs agreed that the protection of both Abadan and the oilfield area could not 
be afforded except at ‘serious cost to our global strategy both in peace and war’.30  
Even with the cooperation of Iranian forces an entire division would be required.  
Without such cooperation a larger force would be necessary. They noted that even if 
British military action should secure Abadan and the oilfields there was no guarantee 
that this would ensure the continued supply of oil as this depended on Iranian labour 
which was unlikely to be forthcoming in the circumstances. In addition to this, they 
advised, British military action might lead to difficulties in the UN, provide the Soviet 
Union with an opportunity to intervene in Iran and premature action could, by 
inflaming nationalist sentiment, actually endanger rather than protect British lives.31   
 
At a meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee on 2 April Morrison noted that it was 
too early to decide upon military action, except the move of certain naval units. It was 
therefore agreed that the Chiefs of Staff would keep plans in a state of readiness but 
that the premature move of troops might cause a hostile reaction in Iran and across the 
Middle East.32 After serious rioting on 12 April, and in the absence of more overt 
preparations, the cruiser HMS Gambia and two frigates were deployed to the northern 
Gulf.33
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On 3 May, one day after nationalisation was proclaimed as Iranian law, Attlee 
informed the Cabinet that he had decided to appoint a small group of ministers to 
‘watch the situation and to authorise action’ that could not await consideration by the 
full cabinet. This ‘Ministerial Committee on Persia’ would comprise the Prime 
Minister (Attlee), the Foreign Secretary (Morrison), the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
(Hugh Gaitskell), the Minister of Fuel and Power (Philip Noel-Baker) and the 
Minister of Defence (Emanuel Shinwell).  Within this group both the Foreign 
Secretary and the Minister of Defence were relatively hawkish. The Minister of 
Defence, Emanuel Shinwell, agreed with Morrison that military action might become 
necessary. On 1 May he had informed the Chiefs of Staff that ‘…the time might 
shortly come when it would be necessary to use strong arm tactics in Persia’. He 
believed that if the Iranians attempted to seize the oilfields without direct assistance 
from the Soviet Union then the UK should be ready to intervene with military force to 
protect the oilfields and associated areas. He was even willing to contemplate moving 
an army division from Germany to Iran for this purpose.34 The Chiefs were equally 
hawkish. On 9 May they informed the Ministerial Committee of their view that failure 
in Iran would undermine the whole British position in the Middle East and that they 
favoured taking a ‘tough line’ with Iran. However, they noted that the necessary 
military preparations might require partial mobilisation and the declaration of a state 
of emergency.35  
 
On 5 May Morrison outlined to Attlee four alternative responses to the act of 
nationalisation. Firstly, Britain could freeze Iran’s Sterling balances, amounting to 
some £25 million, and cancel the Memorandum of Understanding under which Iran 
was provided with dollars in exchange for Sterling for certain purposes, including 
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essential imports. Secondly, the AIOC could demand arbitration under Article 22 of 
the 1933 Concession Agreement. If the Iranian Government refused this then the 
British could present the case before the International Court of Justice at the Hague.  
Thirdly, the dispute could be taken to the UN Security Council. Finally, ‘in the last 
resort’, Britain could make a show of force. Morrison noted that there were serious 
drawbacks to each approach. At this point he would not recommend a show of 
military force as a means of resolving the dispute. Instead, he favoured sending an 
ambassador to Tehran to negotiate with the Iranian government.  
 
In addition to Accleton the military developed Plan Bracket. Both plans were 
designed to protect British lives and property in Abadan and to secure the refinery and 
other AIOC installations on the basis of ‘more or less’ cooperative Iranian security 
forces. Accleton was based on the use of staging facilities in Iraq while Bracket 
catered for the more challenging situation where such facilities were not available.36 
The Iranians were believed to have four infantry battalions on Abadan in addition to a 
naval and marine garrison of around 1200 men and around a dozen tanks and some 
armoured cars. The army reported that if there was organised military opposition then 
a larger UK force would be required and this was likely to mean that Britain would be 
unable to fulfil all of its NATO commitments and could even require a partial 
mobilisation of reserves.37  
 
Accleton and Bracket were rapidly superseded by a new plan, Jagged, which also 
presupposed cooperation or at least non-intervention by Iranian forces. If this were 
not the case the forces allocated to Jagged could conduct Plan Midget, designed to 
cover the evacuation of AIOC personnel in the face of Iranian hostility. If Iranian 
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opposition made the transfer of troops to Abadan by air impossible then the leading 
battalion would fly to Bahrain before transferring to a Royal Navy cruiser for sea 
transport to Abadan. The second contingent would fly to Abadan once the airfield had 
been secured. The Chiefs of Staff were happy that both Jagged and Midget were 
satisfactory plans and that they presented ‘no particular military difficulty’.38  
 
In the case of Midget this was a remarkably sanguine view. A single battalion packed 
into a cruiser would be capable of conducting an administrative landing at the port 
facilities at Abadan. However, although a cruiser could land small parties of troops in 
its own ships’ boats it could not carry the large numbers of specialist landing craft that 
would enable its embarked force to conduct a landing against serious armed 
opposition. In view of the presence on Abadan of large numbers of Iranian troops, 
including tanks, it appears that Midget was only viable if the Iranians were willing to 
allow British troops to establish themselves ashore without a fight.  
 
Bold and Quick Action? 
 
Initially, elements within the UK armed forces appeared willing to countenance great 
risks in order to achieve swift and decisive action to secure Abadan.  On 18 May the 
Chief of the Air Staff, Sir John Slessor, suggested that, given the likely poor quality of 
Iranian troops, the direct landing by air at Abadan of a brigade-sized force might be ‘a 
worthwhile risk’ even in the face of armed opposition.  This was particularly the case, 
he said, if fighter cover could be provided from airfields in Kuwait.39  The three 
service Commanders-in Chief (Cs-in-C) Middle East were thus instructed by the 
Ministry of Defence to submit plans for ‘bold and quick action’ designed to seize 
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Abadan island by fait accompli.  In accordance with Slessor’s suggestion, the first 
wave was to be of around brigade strength and would fly direct to Abadan airfield, 
covered by a fighter squadron operating from Kuwait (it was assumed that facilities in 
Iraq would not be available).  The Cs-in-C were informed that the majority of the 
Parachute Brigade was not currently fit to carry out an airborne operation or to be 
employed in Iran.  To make matters worse, the RAF transport forces in the Middle 
East were not operationally equipped or trained for the parachute role.40  However, 
there was a possibility of landing one or two companies by parachute to secure the 
airfield prior to the arrival of the main force.41   
 
It is probably fortunate that the Chiefs of Staff eventually rejected such ideas.  At their 
meeting on 21 May they agreed that a direct landing at Abadan airfield, as suggest by 
Slessor, was too risky.  They considered that a ‘proper operation, to include an 
opposed sea landing at Abadan’ would probably be necessary. 42  Field Marshal Slim, 
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff43, believed that the solution lay in landing as 
strong a force as early as possible.  He favoured an amphibious assault, landing two 
brigades supported by a strong naval element and possibly accompanied by a two 
company parachute drop to secure the airfield.44  Unfortunately, this was not possible.   
Further investigation revealed that the armed forces were in no position to take 
immediate action.  Neither the troops nor shipping to conduct such an operation was 
available in the Gulf.  It was estimated that it would take six weeks from the time that 
orders were given before troops could be ashore in Abadan, by which time the 
Iranians were liable to have been reinforced. 45   
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Both Slessor and Slim accepted that a quick operation was not viable.  Slessor noted 
with some regret that ‘Something of this sort had, however, been the only chance of 
action without our being faced with the need for full scale recapture operations’. In 
the light of these circumstances the Chiefs adopted a rather cautious tone, 
recommending the imposition of economic sanctions and the implementation of the 
Midget evacuation plan should the need arise.  46   The Minister of Defence, on the 
other hand, remained hawkish.  He declared, with remarkable prescience, that: 
 
If Persia was allowed to get away with it, Egypt and other Middle East 
countries would be encouraged to think they could try things on: the next 
thing there might be an attempt to nationalise the Suez Canal.47
 
Unfortunately for Shinwell, Britain did not possess the necessary forces in the region 
to impose a swift and decisive military solution to the political problem.  
 
Plan Midget, Plan X and Plan Y. 
 
By 25 May the Chiefs of Staff had decided that in view of the strength of Iranian 
forces on Abadan Midget could not work as an airborne operation. Instead troops 
would have to be airlifted to the RAF base at Shaiba before conducting a land 
advance to the island.48 The Iraqi government reluctantly agreed that Shaiba could be 
used for this purpose, but only if the operation was limited to the protection of British 
lives.49 The idea of a land advance from Shaiba was later rejected in favour of 
moving troops from Shaiba to Abadan by ship or boat as an advance across 40 miles 
of desert would ‘not result in troops arriving in good condition’.50 However, by the 
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end of June the planners in the Middle East were again pressing for the plan to be 
changed to cater for a land advance from Shaiba for forces landed by air and from 
Kuwait by those landed by sea. This was because the available ships and craft would 
have difficulties conducting an assault landing due to the prevailing tides, currents 
and beaches around Abadan.51 An additional problem was that no British troops in 
the Middle East were trained in amphibious operations. 52 The land approach was 
politically vulnerable as it required unrestricted access through Iraq and this could not 
be guaranteed.53 It also appears to have neglected the fact that any military force 
advancing on Abadan by land would still have to cross the Shatt al Arab, presumably 
in the same ships and boats that would have been used in an amphibious landing.   
 
Military plans were not limited to protecting British lives but also included a 
requirement to protect property and interests. Three plans existed: 
 
1. Plan Midget: designed to cover the evacuation of British and other friendly 
nationals should there seem a prospect that their lives might be in danger. 
2. Plan X: to seize and hold Abadan Island in the face of Iranian opposition. 
3. Plan Y: to seize and hold both Abadan Island and the oilfields inland in order 
to ensure the resumption of oil production and export. 
 
All three plans assumed the active opposition of Iranian forces which were described 
as ‘not very formidable in quality’. Nevertheless, what they lacked in quality they 
made up for in numbers. There were now four infantry battalions, two marine 
battalions and a squadron of thirteen M4 Sherman tanks in Abadan with an additional 
infantry division 70 miles away in the Ahwaz region. 54
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 Midget required the deployment of two infantry battalions and a force headquarters 
supported by air and maritime assets. The completion of certain preliminary moves, 
including the despatch of 15 Hastings transport aircraft to the Suez Canal Zone, meant 
that the plan could now be implemented at short notice. However, the Chiefs 
considered that the small number of forces employed meant that Iranian opposition 
would present a ‘serious hazard’ to its success.55
 
Midget had been sub-divided into three different operations, Courses A, B and C.  
Course A was based upon the airlift of two battalions of infantry direct into Abadan, 
the first troops arriving on D Day and the remainder flying in on D+1. The option was 
ruled out by Chiefs of Staff as too risky. Course B required the first battalion to fly to 
Shaiba and thence from Basra to Abadan by cruiser on D Day. The second battalion 
and supporting arms would either fly direct to Abadan on D+1 or follow the Shaiba-
Basra-Abadan route arriving on D+2. Course C catered for the situation where Iraqi 
facilities were not available. The initial battalion would fly to Bahrain on D-Day and 
move by sea to Abadan on D+1. The second battalion and supporting arms would fly 
direct to Abadan on D+1 as soon as the airfield was secure. The timings in each case 
were dependent on 48 hours notice before D Day in order to concentrate and position 
ships, troops and transport aircraft.56  
 
The military planners were concerned that activating Midget might have the opposite 
effect to that which was desired. There was a danger that the overt move of troops to 
Shaiba prior to their arrival at Abadan would provoke disturbances on the island that 
would pose a serious threat to British lives before arrival of the first troops.57 It was 
 17
also noted that the requirement to meet the threat of a British landing might cause the 
Iranian security forces to neglect their obligation to protect foreign nationals.58 It was 
later agreed that a detachment of infantry should be maintained on a cruiser anchored 
close off Abadan. Poised offshore on the Iraqi side of the Shatt al Arab and available 
at a moments notice these troops could at least provide some form of military 
presence ashore prior to the arrival of the main force.59
 
The military were also concerned about the chances of success in Plan X. This plan 
could not lead in itself to the resumption of oil production as it would not ensure the 
supply of oil from the oilfields. Its main aim would be to ‘induce a reasonable frame 
of mind in the Persian Government.’  The Chiefs of Staff believed that for such a plan 
to succeed it would have to be capable of being carried out with limited forces, at very 
short notice and at great speed. Surviving records are incomplete, but Plan X appears 
to have been based on a plan codenamed Companion devised by the Cs-in-C Middle 
East at the request of the Ministry of Defence. The object of Companion was ‘to move 
forces to seize and secure Abadan Island and to protect the refinery and other 
installations so that export of oil may be resumed as oil is received from the oilfields’. 
60 It was based upon the assumption that the very early arrival of a comparatively 
small force (two infantry brigades plus supporting arms) would enable the British to 
seize Abadan island and that surprise would effectively prevent successful resistance 
by Iranian forces. Ground forces were to fly direct to Abadan after the airfield had 
been captured by a small airborne operation by elements of the Parachute Brigade.61 
As such it was an inherently risky operation. Given the build-up of Iranian troops in 
the area the Chiefs considered that the risk of failure was too great to make 
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Companion/Plan X a sound military proposition without the level of forces allocated 
to Plan Y.  
 
Plan Y was based on the seizure of both Abadan and the oilfields and a subsequent 
internal security operation to protect the refinery, oilfields and pipelines. It required a 
military force in the order of one infantry division, plus an additional infantry brigade, 
an armoured brigade and supporting units. It would also need appropriate support 
from air and sea. A military effort on this scale would have had serious implications 
for British commitments elsewhere. It would require the replacement of the entire 
Middle East garrison by forces from the UK. There would need to be a call-up of 
reservists and the partial mobilisation of the army. A large number of vehicles in the 
UK would need to be requisitioned. The transportation of the force would require 25 
personnel ships and 35 freight ships and this would require further requisitioning. 
Once preliminary moves and redistributions had been completed it would still take 
between six and eight weeks for the leading wave of any force to reach Abadan and 
the full force could not concentrate there in less than four months. 
 
The COS appeared well aware of political complications. They noted that even should 
UK forces succeed in seizing the oilfields and refinery intact, it was by no means 
certain that any Iranian personnel would be willing to work in them. The military 
appear to have been rather less hawkish than some of their political leaders. The 
Chiefs concluded that: 
 
In the circumstances as they are to-day…there is in our view no certainty that 
this major military operation, involving a commitment of indefinite duration, 
would have any effect that might not equally well be achieved by political and 
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economic measures – principally the withholding of tanker and marketing 
facilities.62
 
Preparing for Action 
 
A key constraint for the military planners was the availability of shipping to transport 
troops and equipment. In late March the cruiser HMS Gambia had arrived in the Gulf 
and joined two frigates already stationed there.63 Conditions onboard the cruiser, at 
anchor and without air conditioning, were very difficult. On 5 May Gambia was 
relieved by HMS Mauritius which, in turn, was relieved by the cruiser HMS Euryalus 
in early July.64 The heavy guns of these cruisers made them very potent fire support 
platforms65 but they were not ideally suited to transporting large numbers of troops 
and equipment, nor were they equipped to land them in a tactical formation. For this 
purpose amphibious shipping would be required. Unfortunately, the provision of 
Landing Ship, Tanks (LSTs), the navy’s primary amphibious vessel, was a cause of 
concern. The Amphibious Warfare Squadron created in 1951 should have been 
capable of providing lift for a battalion group at short notice and a brigade group after 
thirty days. Unfortunately, the Squadron was based at Malta and it would take some 
time before any of its slow ships could complete the journey through the Suez Canal 
to the Gulf. A further problem was that many of the LSTs required for Plan Y had not 
had their decks stiffened and thus could not safely carry the army’s new heavy 
Centurion tanks.66  
 
Prior to the crisis the Royal Navy had no amphibious ships or craft in the Gulf. The 
LST HMS Messina sailed from Malta for the Gulf on 16 May, arriving off Bahrain 24 
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days later. The ship then sailed to Basra. This ship was designed to embark around 15 
tanks and 15 lorries or their equivalent and had accommodation for 150 troops. It 
could land the embarked force directly onto a suitable beach through bow doors.67 In 
addition to this the ship was also equipped with five small landing craft that could be 
lowered by davits and then sail independently to the shore. Each landing craft could 
carry around 30 troops. The ship was not designed to operate in the extreme 
temperature of the Gulf and was not equipped with air conditioning. Kept stationary 
at anchor yet required to maintain steam in order to be ready to sail immediately the 
ship became unbearably hot. Temperatures below decks reached over 50 degrees 
centigrade. Reportedly, all of the cockroaches on board died and all of the flies flew 
away. These beneficial side effects were mitigated by the fact that the ship’s cat, 
‘Snowy’, had to be put down after becoming literally like ‘a cat on hot bricks’. The 
scalding decks and bulwarks could also be a hazard to human health.68
 
The potential employment of HMS Messina was also rather hazardous. In the case of 
operations at Abadan it was to carry 150 tons of stores, ammunition, vehicles and 
equipment down the Shatt al Arab to Abadan. It would also embark infantry brought 
forward from the airfield at Shaiba. Unfortunately, the eastern bank of the river was 
Iranian territory and therefore the passage downstream could be opposed. In order to 
meet this eventuality, anti-tank guns were secured to the port side of the ship. These, 
in conjunction with the vessel’s own anti-aircraft guns and the light machine guns and 
mortars of the embarked force, were designed to suppress any opposition. The 
shallow draft of the LST made it a useful vessel for riverine operations. 
Unfortunately, these ships did not carry any heavy armament nor did they have any 
armour. As such they were extremely vulnerable to enemy fire. It is remarkable that 
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only two years after the Amethyst incident the Royal Navy was willing to consider 
sailing such a vulnerable vessel, packed with troops and equipment, in an opposed 
passage down river within sight and range of enemy forces. 
 
It was not just the vulnerability of LSTs that was a cause of concern. Their 
availability was also a critical factor. In late June the Joint Planning Staff reported 
that although 16 LSTs were available in the UK and the Mediterranean it would take 
30 days for the first one to reinforce Messina in the Gulf. To make matters worse only 
two more could arrive within less than two months. The majority of LSTs held in 
reserve or refitting in the UK could not reach the Gulf before September and some 
could not be made available before November.69
 
By the end of the month the Chiefs of Staff were able to report that if preliminary 
action was ordered by 2 July the leading elements of a UK force could reach Abadan 
by about 19 August. This was not a particularly rapid response. To make matters 
worse, such preliminary action could not be covert. The commissioning of the 
necessary amphibious ships would require the immobilisation of ten destroyers and 
frigates and two minesweepers. Men would have to be transferred from the Reserve 
Fleet and reservists would have to be recalled to service. The army would require an 
additional 10,000 men to bring the necessary forces to full strength and this would 
require the recall of reservists, the retention of regular troops due to leave and an 
extension of overseas tours. The government would also have to charter a number of 
civilian aircraft.70   
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The need to overtly re-commission mothballed amphibious ships and to recall 
reservists meant that such preparatory moves could not be kept secret. The 
government was aware of the political implications of such action. Conscious of the 
difficulty of gaining and maintaining international support for military intervention, 
and constrained by the desire to wait for the results of an impending ruling by the 
International Court of Justice, the Cabinet decided that no preparatory action should 
be taken if it was likely to become known publicly. As the Cabinet minutes 
explained: 
 
‘…it would be unwise, in advance of this [court] decision, to take any steps 
which might suggest to the Court that the Government had it in mind to take 
the law into its own hands.’   
 
Should the government decide to ‘take the law into its own hands’ very significant 
military forces would be employed. In order to seize Abadan island and to hold it for 
an indefinite period 17 personnel ships and 30 transport and stores ships would be 
required. These would be joined by 12 LSTs carrying 36 landing craft, a maintenance 
ship and a headquarters ship. The navy could provide two frigates or destroyers to 
accompany the amphibious force in addition to the cruiser and two frigates currently 
in the Gulf. The army would deploy the 1st Infantry Division minus one infantry 
brigade, the 16th Parachute Brigade and an armoured regiment, all of which were 
currently based in the Mediterranean or Middle East. If the operation was launched, 
these troops would have to be replaced by forces from elsewhere. The RAF 
contribution would include 24 Hastings long range transport aircraft, five medium 
range transport squadrons, two fighter/ground attack squadrons, a 
fighter/reconnaissance squadron and a light bomber squadron.71 This was a massive 
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military force that would dwarf the British contribution to UN operations in Korea in 
every respect except that of surface warships. 
 
In order to provide for a rapid response should Midget be implemented 15 Hastings 
aircraft were concentrated in the Suez Canal Zone.72 This, in addition to Valetta 
medium range transport aircraft allocated to the Middle East, was sufficient to lift a 
single battalion in the first wave. The Cs-in-C requested a further twelve Hastings so 
as to be able to lift two battalions simultaneously.73 On 2 July Ministers approved a 
Chiefs of Staff proposal for more airlift, including the use of chartered aircraft. 
Thirteen additional Hastings were sent to Egypt, arriving between 5 July and 7 July. 
In addition 10 civilian York airliners belonging to BOAC and the Lancashire Aircraft 
Corporation were chartered along with their crew. The aircraft were to carry RAF 
markings and the aircrew received temporary commissions. This removed restrictions 
that applied to civilian but not military flights into the Canal Zone. Due to congestion 
in Egypt the Yorks were based in Libya at Castel Benito, where they were near to 
their proposed passengers, the 1st Guards Brigade.74 As a result it became possible to 
air lift three battalions forward on D-Day, two more on D+4 and a sixth unit by D+6. 
With the arrival in the Gulf at the end of July of War Department LSTs pre-loaded 
with heavy equipment, Midget could be implemented at short notice.75   
 
On 25 June Slim had informed the Cabinet that it would take 36 hours to put Midget 
into effect. This could be reduced to 12 hours if the forces were assembled in 
advance. It could be reduced still further if they were flown forward to Iraq. The 
Cabinet approved the concentration of forces in Egypt (Canal Zone) but deferred a 
decision about moving troops to Iraq.76 This restriction did not apply to the pre-
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positioning of HMS Messina at Basra.77 Ministers later agreed to the limited pre-
positioning of troops and stores at Shaiba but only on the basis that these were kept to 
the absolute minimum required for advance parties and the maintenance of stores and 
that they must in no circumstances include formed units.78  
 
The problem facing the British was that in order to protect British lives it was 
important to get sufficient troops ashore at the first opportunity. Troops held offshore 
in the cruiser could land at very short notice and could be supported by the ships guns 
once ashore. However, there would not be enough of them to guarantee the safety of 
British nationals. Pre-positioning ground and air forces at Shaiba could ensure a rapid 
response but had potential drawbacks. Shaiba was an unpleasant place to stay in the 
heat of the Arabian summer and it lacked facilities for the brigade-sized force now 
envisaged for Midget. The premature deployment of a military force to Iraq could not 
be hidden and might cause unrest amongst local Iraqi nationalists and Iranian 
nationalists in Abadan. Midget (and later Buccaneer) relied on a degree of surprise for 
success. Deployment of troops to Shaiba would remove any element of surprise and 
could prompt the Iranians to move their division from Ahwaz to Abadan, or possibly 
even to take AIOC personnel as hostages. As a result, Cs-in-C were informed that 
they could pre-position Midget forces at Shaiba on or after 25 July but only ‘if the 
situation in the oilfields has become so critical as to make it probable that 
“BUCCANEER” will be ordered in the immediate future’.79 In the event, no infantry 
battalions deployed to Iraq although the RAF did deploy fighter/ground attack aircraft 
at Shaiba and Habbaniya.  
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It is noteworthy that throughout the crisis the Royal Navy did not deploy an aircraft 
carrier to the northern Gulf. In 1951-2 the Navy had 15 carriers, of which four were 
on active service.80 On 30 May 1951 the Chiefs of Staff requested the Admiralty to 
investigate the possibility of providing such a ship.81 An aircraft carrier would have 
been particularly useful as it could have provided fighter and strike aircraft to cover 
operations in Abadan if facilities in Shaiba were not available. The only viable 
alternative to Shaiba, Kuwait, was at the extreme limits of range for RAF jet fighters 
and as the airfield facilities at Kuwait were very basic the military planners were 
forced to conclude that the air support plan for operations larger than Midget could 
not work without use of Shaiba.82 This was rather unfortunate as the Iraqis would 
only allow use of Shaiba for operations designed to protect British lives, i.e. Midget 
but not Plan Y. An aircraft carrier would have alleviated these difficulties. However, 
with the requirement to maintain a carrier in support of UN operations in Korea and 
residual commitments around the globe the Admiralty clearly felt that the could not 
provide one of these vessels on call to support potential operations in Iran. 
 
Political Complications 
 
These military difficulties were exacerbated by political factors. A clear problem for 
the British was the attitude of the United States towards the use of military force at 
Abadan. The American position was communicated to the British government in 
unequivocal terms. The US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and President Truman 
both expressed great concern that the British might use military force against the 
existing Iranian administration.83 The Americans were clearly opposed to military 
action to seize Abadan and were less than enthusiastic about an armed response 
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designed to protect British lives. The British ambassador in Washington was asked to 
clarify whether this implied a speedy withdrawal of British personnel or ‘something 
more – involving an armed clash with Persian troops’. He was informed that ‘the 
President felt most strongly that no situation should be allowed to develop into an 
armed conflict between a body of British troops and the Persian forces of the existing 
administration’.84 To further complicate matters, on 25 May the Attorney General 
informed his colleagues that in his opinion the UK had ‘no right at all’ under 
international law independent of a UN resolution to intervene by force either to 
prevent the act of nationalisation or to prevent a wrong being committed to a British 
national.85
 
In July the Foreign Office completed a study of the political implications of armed 
intervention at Abadan. They noted that while there might be some disquiet at the use 
of force without sanction by the UN, public opinion in Britain would probably 
support military action ‘in the main’. Winston Churchill had already privately offered 
Attlee the support of the Conservative Party in such an eventuality.86 American 
opposition to the use of armed force was well known. The only circumstance in 
which the Americans would support the use of force was if it were in response to a 
revolutionary coup by the communist Tudeh party.87 The Foreign Office had 
considered the possibility of justifying military action on the basis that such a coup 
was imminent but later accepted that as such an eventuality was ‘at present not 
demonstrable’ this excuse was unlikely to appeal to world opinion in general and to 
American opinion in particular.88 The Foreign Office believed that within the 
Commonwealth the old Dominions would probably support British military action but 
that both India and Pakistan would be critical. Rather unkindly they concluded that 
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Ceylon’s opinion, if expressed, ‘would hardly matter’.89 The Foreign Office 
remained concerned that the Soviet Union might exploit British military action to 
their own advantage, possibly even invoking the 1921 Treaty as an excuse to occupy 
northern Iran. However, it was surmised that although the Iranian government would 
appeal to the UN, they would not turn to the Soviets for help as they were ‘more 
scared of them than us’. It was anticipated that there would be much criticism from 
within the Arab world but that this would pass if the action were successful and might 
result in greater respect for the UK. In the view of the Foreign Office, ‘Any other 
attempts to “nationalise” foreign interests would be discouraged’.90
 
Attlee was very well aware of the difficulty of justifying intervention to protect 
British interests and property rather than merely to protect British lives.  In June he 
explained to the Defence Committee that ‘we must at all costs avoid getting into the 
position where we could be represented as a capitalist power attacking a nationalist 
Persia’. However, he came up with an interesting solution. He suggested that ‘…we 
should endeavour to arrange things so that our apparent position was one of 
supporting a legitimate Persian Government against either an invasion or a 
Communist civil war’. 91
 
As a result it was decided that although there could be no question of conducting Plan 
Y against the existing government the plan should be adjusted to enable it to provide 
support for that government in the event of a Soviet attack or communist coup.92 In 
reality, despite the change in rationale, the plan remained largely unaffected, focusing 
on control of Abadan and the oil areas.93 Such action might create a stable enclave for 
forces loyal to the Shah, but the military planners were well aware that control of the 
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oil areas might still be rather hard to represent as disinterested assistance against a 
communist insurgency.94
 
Plan Buccaneer 
 
As the build-up of forces continued the British military position improved. As a 
result, on 18 June the Minister of Fuel and Power suggested that Abadan might be 
taken and held indefinitely, operating with oil imported from Kuwait. He also wanted 
consideration to be given to holding Abadan long enough to remove the 1 million 
tons of oil estimated to be stored there.95 The idea was examined by the Chiefs of 
Staff and the Cs-in-C were informed that, should Midget be met by very limited 
Iranian opposition, they should be prepared to reinforce and maintain the Midget 
forces with the object of remaining in Abadan. 96 As a result by early July there were 
four plans for military intervention:97
 
1. MIDGET  Protection and evacuation of British and friendly nationals.98  
2. MIDGET REINFORCED To maintain Midget in order to remain in Abadan. 99
3. LETHAL100 To seize Abadan Island and hold for an indefinite period.101
4. DISCIPLE  To help the Iranian Government to restore order against  
Communist insurrection.102
 
 On 10 July the Ministry of Defence was informed that Midget and Midget 
Reinforced had been replaced by a single plan codenamed Buccaneer, described as 
follows: 
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Phase One.  Move of forces to Abadan to cover the evacuation of friendly AIOC  
employees and dependents in the face of opposition by Iranian Forces. 
Phase Two.   To remain in Abadan to safeguard British lives and property. 
 
Later a third phase was added, to provide for the reinforcement of phase one and/or 
two should they require it. Both Disciple and Lethal required a scale of forces that the 
British would have struggled to provide. The Cabinet were not willing to sanction the 
overt military preparations that would be required to prepare for operations on this 
scale. As a result both plans were abandoned and in late July the Cs-in-C were 
informed that Buccaneer was the only plan that need be ‘kept in mind’.103
 
In common with Midget, Buccaneer Phase 1 was designed to protect and evacuate 
British personnel and friendly nationals from Abadan. It was based upon the 
assumption that facilities in Iraq would be available. The military force employed 
would include a brigade headquarters, three infantry battalions, a squadron of tanks 
and an artillery field regiment less one battery. In support of the ground force were a 
Royal Navy cruiser, four destroyers, a frigate and the LST HMS Messina. The air 
transport force included a total of eighty aircraft and air support would be provided by 
an RAF Brigand squadron operating from Shaiba.104 A further two LSTs operated by 
the War Department pre-loaded with tanks and artillery were pre-positioned in the 
northern Gulf. These would carry the tanks and artillery for Buccaneer, embarking 
army personnel at Kuwait and Basra should the operation be mounted. The initial 
military force was to fly to Shaiba and then on to Basra by road before being 
transported to Abadan by HMS Messina and two destroyers. Follow on forces would 
come by air (infantry) and sea (heavy equipment). It was intended that AIOC 
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personnel would have withdrawn to Abadan from the oilfields before Buccaneer was 
put into effect. Forces would concentrate in Abadan within 24 hours of the receipt of 
the order to move, less if pre-positioning had taken place.   
 
Buccaneer Phase 2 was intended to reinforce and maintain forces deployed in Phase 
1. The Cs-in-C also had discretion to implement Phase 2 in order to support the 
evacuation of AIOC personnel during Phase 1 should the need arise. The military 
force for Phase 2 provided an additional Guards brigade and a divisional headquarters 
plus engineering and administrative elements. Air support would be provided by three 
fighter/ground attack squadrons and one light bomber squadron. In addition to the 
Royal Navy ships and LSTs provided for in Phase 1, three store ships pre-loaded with 
375 vehicles and 2000 tons of stores would be positioned off Bahrain ready to support 
intervention.105 Phase 3 was designed to build the force up to the scale of one infantry 
division plus an armoured regiment. It was based upon the arrival of an additional 
infantry brigade, two squadrons of tanks, an additional field artillery regiment plus an 
additional artillery battery to complete the regiment deployed under Phase 1. The 
main element of this force would arrive by sea and air by D+6 although the force 
would not be complete within 35 days of the requisite shipping leaving the Suez 
Canal Zone. The Chiefs of Staff considered that Phase 3 would only be undertaken if 
Phase 1 and 2 went seriously wrong.106
 
In view of the political and military difficulties associated with intervention the 
Cabinet agreed on 12 July that military action in Iran, on a larger scale than that 
necessary for the protection of British lives, should not be contemplated unless there 
was a fundamental change in the situation there.107 As military preparations for 
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Buccaneer continued some civilian and military leaders continued to press for more 
robust action to protect property as well as lives. The Chiefs of Staff advised against 
withdrawing from Abadan and on 18 July urged the Ministerial Committee on Persia 
to agree to mount Buccaneer at the end of July with the object of seizing and holding 
the island.108 Two days later Herbert Morrison reported to the Cabinet that 
preparations for Buccaneer had reached the point where it was now feasible to occupy 
and hold Abadan against any opposition that the Iranians unaided (i.e. by the Soviets) 
could mount. He resurrected the idea of holding onto Abadan and operating the 
refinery with imported crude.109 In a private meeting with Attlee, Morrison, Shinwell 
and Gaitskell in the House of Commons Churchill, accompanied by his deputy, 
Anthony Eden, also supported the idea of holding Abadan Island.110   
 
The Chiefs of Staff abandoned their cautious stance of May. The First Sea Lord, Lord 
Fraser, informed his colleagues on the Chiefs of Staff Committee that he was 
‘horrified’ that the idea now seemed to be that Britain should withdraw from Abadan 
no matter what the success of Buccaneer. He declared that withdrawal would cause a 
great outcry amongst the British public who were ‘tired of being pushed around by 
Persian pip-squeaks’. He wanted the Chiefs to press Ministers to agree that if 
Buccaneer was put into force they should stay in Abadan and not withdraw. His 
colleagues agreed and the Committee recommended that the object of Buccaneer 
should be changed to the seizure and holding of Abadan island.111 On 20 July Slessor 
informed his equally hawkish subordinate at HQ Middle East Air Force that ‘We are 
doing our utmost to persuade our masters to allow us to go in to Abadan and stay in.  
It is an uphill job’.112 However, the Cabinet deferred any decision on military action 
and the restrictions of 12 July stood. 
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 The alert state of the forces held in readiness for Buccaneer varied through July, 
August and September in accordance with developments in Iran. At one stage the 
forces moved to three hours notice to move, although this was later reduced to 24 
hours and then 72 hours as the crisis ebbed and flowed.113 At a meeting of the 
Ministerial Committee on 25 September the Chiefs once again argued in favour of 
military action and, once again, ministers decided that there could be no military 
action in Iran for any purpose beyond that required to protect British lives.114 That 
day the Iranian Government issued an ultimatum giving British AIOC personnel 
seven days to leave the county. In a Cabinet meeting on 27 September Morrison 
continued to support the military option but was overruled by his Cabinet colleagues. 
Attlee cited the opposition of the United States and the danger of being isolated in the 
UN as key political factors arguing against intervention. In addition, he noted that 
military action might well unite the Iranian people and government against the British 
and that neither the oilfields or the refinery could operate without Iranian 
personnel.115 On 31 September the Foreign Office announced that the few remaining 
entitled AIOC personnel were being withdrawn from Abadan and on 1 October 
Britain referred the issue to the UN.116 By 3 October all remaining AIOC personnel 
had been evacuated safely and with the cooperation of the Iranian security forces and 
on 4 October all plans for military action in Iran were stood down.117
Conclusion 
 
The Abadan crisis demonstrated the extent to which Britain’s military and political 
position had changed since the Second World War. Dependent on the United States 
for economic and military assistance, Britain could not afford to alienate its most 
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powerful ally. Nor could it afford to act without due regard to opinion within the UN 
and the Commonwealth. There was also a lingering fear that any unilateral action on 
the part of Britain might be exploited by the Soviet Union.  Shorn of the Indian Army 
and with commitments around the globe the British lacked the ready military 
manpower to mount a major operation in south-west Iran without denuding other 
areas. The military had not yet developed the concepts and equipment that would 
allow them to efficiently deploy limited military forces overseas. Military weakness 
compounded political constraints. That is not to say that the military were useless.  
There was an obvious need to prepare for the evacuation of British personnel should 
the need arise and the apparent ability of the British to intervene in Abadan may have 
been a constraint on the Iranian government and public. However, evacuation 
operations without the consent of the Iranians would have been seriously hampered by 
the inevitable time delay in bringing troops forward from Shaiba. Without some 
means of deploying troops directly into Abadan at very short notice the military were 
ultimately unable to guarantee the safety of British lives. Operations designed to 
secure property were even more problematic. The need to overtly commission and 
requisition shipping and to mobilise troops would telegraph British intentions leading, 
inevitably, to political repercussions. Britain could only provide the scale of forces 
required to seize and hold Abadan and the oilfields at the expense of commitments 
elsewhere and after the mobilisation of reserves. The crisis also demonstrated 
Britain’s reliance on overseas bases that could be denied to them. 
 
In any crisis where the use of military force is contemplated the ability to act quickly, 
before opposition forces organise and before domestic and international opinion 
against such action has had time to form, is likely to prove decisive. In his 
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autobiography Herbert Morrison noted that ‘The crux of the matter was that if military 
action was to be politically effective it should be quick’.118 In this sense the Chief of 
the Air Staff, Sir John Slessor, was right to stress the requirement for some form of 
‘bold and quick action’ to seize Abadan island by fait accompli. Unfortunately the 
armed forces were in no position to provide such a response. The Parachute Brigade 
was not ready or available to conduct anything but the smallest airborne operation and 
Britain’s amphibious forces were few in number, deployed at some distance from the 
Gulf and poorly designed for the kind of operations that were required. In May the 
Chiefs of Staff were forced to accept that a swift military response to the 
nationalisation crisis was not realistic 
 
This was a little surprising given the disparity in national military strength between 
the UK and Iran. The Foreign Secretary was exasperated by this, stating that ‘…he 
was very disappointed, I view of the large expenditure on the rearmament programme 
to learn that so little could be done to support our foreign policy with military 
action’.119 Unfortunately, although the rearmament programme initiated in 1950 by 
the Labour Government brought additional funds to the armed forces it did not bring a 
basic change in overall defence policy. The main priority remained the requirement to 
prepare for future conflict in Europe against the Soviet Union. Relatively little 
emphasis was placed on expeditionary forces able to project power rapidly and 
effectively in a wide range of circumstances. This was illustrated by the lack of a 
significant airborne or amphibious assault capability ready and available to respond to 
unforeseen crises beyond Europe. Military forces are only useful if they can be 
deployed at an appropriate time and place and in an appropriate fashion. Britain’s 
inability to do this was evident throughout this crisis.  
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 What Britain needed at the outbreak of the crisis in March-April 1951 was a means of 
bringing credible military power to bear at short notice and in a manner that was 
politically acceptable. This could have been provided by a fully trained and properly 
equipped airborne brigade, although provision of air support would have been 
difficult in the absence of an aircraft carrier and without use of the RAF base at 
Shaiba. An airborne force, lightly equipped without tanks or heavy artillery, would 
also have been vulnerable to Iranian counter-attack until it was reinforced by air and 
sea. A modern amphibious task group carrying a balanced military force and able to 
poise out of sight of land in the northern Gulf would have provided many useful 
options, either independently or in conjunction with an airborne force. It could have 
deployed to the crisis area without fanfare and without having to negotiate either 
transit rights or basing facilities. It could then have been held in a state of readiness, 
able to withdraw or intervene as circumstances demanded. Its embarked military force 
would have been able to land at Abadan at short notice, removing the dangerous 
pause inevitable with existing plans to fly troops through Shaiba. In many respects it 
was precisely such a force that spearheaded the successful British intervention in 
Kuwait in 1961. Unfortunately, no such capability existed in 1951, nor could it be 
created at short notice. From a British perspective it was unfortunate that the inability 
of the military to mount a rapid response to major crises overseas had to be 
demonstrated again, in 1956, before the armed forces developed a modern 
expeditionary capability. 
 
By 20 July when Morrison announced that it was now feasible to seize and hold 
Abadan island it was already too late. With the United States resolutely opposed to 
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military action against the existing regime, and a hostile reaction inevitable in the 
Arab world, it would have been extremely difficult to launch a military operation to 
secure Abadan without some legitimate excuse. Hence the decision on 12 July that 
military action would be limited to that required to protect British lives. The absence 
of a communist insurrection deprived Britain of the excuse to implement Plan 
Y/Disciple and the ability of the Iranian security forces to maintain order to Abadan 
removed the excuse and the need to implement Midget/Buccaneer. Unfortunately for 
the hawkish elements within the British political and military establishment the 
military only provided solutions when it was too late, by which time they were no 
longer solutions. With the benefit of hindsight, and in the light of the disastrous 
consequences of Anthony Eden’s intervention in Suez, months after the act of 
nationalisation, against the wishes of the United States and on the flimsiest of 
excuses, it is hard to believe that Attlee made the wrong decision.  
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